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ABSTRACT. Coordination is one of the fundamental research issues in 
distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Current multi-agent 
coalition formation methods present two limits: First, computation must be 
completely restarted when a change occurs.  Second, utility functions of the 
agents are either global or aggregated. We present a new algorithm to cope with 
these limits. The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation method 
for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal solution without 
aggregating the preferences of the agents. This protocol is adapted to problems 
requiring coordination by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not 
possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The second part of this 
paper proposes an extension of this method enabling dy amic restructuring of 
coalitions when changes occur in the system.   
KEY WORDS: multi-agent system, coalitions, preferenc s, aggregation, 
reorganization. 
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1 Introduction 
The search for economic efficiency has led to the division of labor between 
specialists. Today, similar reasoning explains the success of agent-oriented 
programming and multi-agent systems. Programs are incr asingly complex and have 
multiple functions which must sometimes be updated or improved. Using a set of 
specialized agents which coordinate their complex tasks gives more flexibility, 
efficiency and evolutivity to programs. To perform complex tasks, agents need to 
coordinate, either because tasks require many resources if they are to be performed by 
a single agent, or because certain sub-tasks can be carri d out more efficiently by 
specialized agents (Binmore, 1999, Ossowski, 2000, Wooldridge, 1999). 
Agents have specific capabilities and are programmed to carry out certain tasks. 
For a given agent complexity, the search for more sphisticated capabilities leads to a 
higher number of agents. Since agents are more and more specialized, they are not 
able to perform complex tasks alone and must necessarily coordinate their tasks with 
others. More generally, a multi-agent system is made up of several homogeneous or 
heterogeneous agents which communicate between themselves(Wooldridge, 2001).  
How can autonomous agents be coordinated efficiently? One solution is to look for 
groups of agents which are able to perform the desired tasks better than one agent. 
This means that agents may form coalitions, a coaliti n being a temporary association 
between agents in order to carry out joint projects. The aim is a better distribution of 
capabilities in order to achieve a complex project, but this is not the only method of 
coordination. It can be imposed by a hierarchy, carried out by bilateral 
contracts(Smith and Davis, 1981), etc.(Sandholm, 1999) 
The choice of solving a problem using the coalition model depends really on the 
type of problem under study. Coalitions are well adapted when there are strong 
externalities (when completing a task influence the utility involved in the resolution 
of an other task) and/or when interactions between agents are such that the 
contribution of an agent within a coalition depends on which agents the coalition 
contains, in which case a bilateral contract would be difficult to negotiate. For 
instance, if the payoff of an agent is the marginal utility it brings into the project, the 
given payoff envisaged would vary during negotiations according to the members 
joining the coalition or leaving it.  
Once coalition formation is chosen as a coordinatio method, the definition of the 
corresponding protocol remains problematic. A coalition formation protocol is 
strongly dependent of the type of problem studied. The fact that the agents do or do 
not have the same objective, do or do not trust each others, are examples of 
parameters which may generate different protocols of coalition formation. 
To enable the agents to form coalitions, all current protocols make the assumption 
that the utility functions of agents, which measure th ir degree of satisfaction for each 
suggested solution, must be comparable or identical. This means that agents must be 
able to agree on a common utility function, either of all the agents as in (Shehory and 
Kraus, 1998), or of their coalition as in (Aknine, Pinson, and Shakun, 2000) and 
(Vauvert and El Fallah-Seghrouchni, 2001). This assumption seems acceptable for 
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most multi-agent systems, in particular for productive projects where all utilities can 
often be calculated in terms of profit. However, in many cases, to compare the utilities 
of agents, and even more to aggregate them, is difficult. The numerical evaluation of 
an agent utility is already a strong assumption compared to the simple classification of 
available choices (Pareto has already shown the many advantages of ordinal utility 
compared to cardinal utility in economics in the XIX century). To compare the 
utilities of two individuals is stronger. Why should a solution weighted 8 by one agent 
and 6 by another be preferred to one weighted respectively 4 and 7? Our model does 
not suppose that the utilities of agents must be aggregated or compared(Caillou, 
Aknine, and Pinson, 2002a).  
A second limitation of current models lies in assuming that all calculations are 
recomputed as one condition changes (an agent joins or leaves a coalition, a task is 
added or canceled, etc.). However these protocols are very complex and these changes 
can be very frequent. Using the information obtained in a previous execution of the 
protocol, i.e. a dynamic reorganization of the coalitions formed, could reduce 
calculations. This is the second aim of our model(Caillou, Aknine, and Pinson, 
2002b). 
 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the application used to 
illustrate our model. Section 3 introduces some definitions. Section 4 details our 
methods of coalition formation and dynamic reorganiz tion of coalitions. Our model 
gives a wide choice of agent behavior. Section 5 proposes a set of behavior models in 
order to improve the computation time. Section 6 presents an application example of 
the protocol and discusses the implementation of our model. The results obtained with 
our models are discussed in section 7. Section 8 analyzes related work. Section 9 
draws a general conclusion from this work and proposes some perspectives. 
2 Application 
The suggested protocol is particularly suitable for problems with complex tasks 
(where there is a need for several agents and for coalitions) and for dynamic problems 
(tasks may be added, others canceled or modified constantly) with different utility 
functions of agents. We assume that agents are cooperative, i.e. they trust each other 
in searching for and applying the solutions. Their utility functions are unknown by the 
other agents and do not need to be cardinal, an ordi al utility is enough. Agents just 
need to be able to choose between two situations (or to be indifferent), they can thus 
be self-interested.  
 
A good example of this problem is a distributed teaching schedule at university. 
This application illustrates the dynamic evolution f the coalitions, as often a course 
may be added or removed, or a professor or a group of students may join the 
establishment. In this example we consider two types of agent: professors and 
students. Student agents represent homogeneous groups of students with a common 
utility function and with the same classes. Of course, it is possible to have an agent 
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for each student and thus to enable him or her to have its own utility function. 
However, the computational complexity will be greatly increased.  
 
The classes correspond to the tasks to be carried out. Thus, agents form a coalition 
for each class. Most coalitions are formed of two agents: a professor agent and a 
student agent (having more agents in a coalition is also possible, for instance for 
lectures with several groups of students). Each (student or professor) agent defines the 
utility it assigns to each schedule. Since its utility function is ordinal, it just needs to 
be able to compare two schedules and to say which one it prefers or if it is indifferent. 
Agents are free to choose their parameters while computing their utility. A professor 
can thus prefer the morning, refuse Mondays, prefer certain classes, like a stable 
schedule, etc.  
In a general way, the choice of an agent depends on the members of the coalitions 
in which it will take part, but its appreciation of a coalition may also change 
according to the other coalitions. This introduces xternalities or an ordered 
processing of tasks. Thus, if a task Ti must be carried out before Tj, the utility that the 
agent will associate to Tj will be null if no agent takes part in the coalition which 
performs Ti (task Ti is then not performed, and Tj is of no interest). The agent choice 
may also depend on parameters which are related to its preferences and which vary in 
time. Thus, it can be against change. For instance, a professor may prefer one 
schedule to another because it is closer to the curr nt situation. The only constraint is 
that these external parameters need to be stable during a negotiation step.  
 
3 Definitions 
This section presents some definitions necessary to understand our model and 
which we use in the rest of this article.  
 
Coalition: a coalition is formed for each task to be performed. It contains zero, one 
or more agents which will carry out actions in order to achieve this task. Each action 
and its parameters are defined (for instance, the parameters of the action “taking a 
class” are: the week, the day and the time). 
 
Coalition set: a coalition set represents a solution to the problem of coalition 
formation. It contains as many coalitions as tasks to be performed at a given moment 
(in our application, a set corresponds to one schedule).  
 
Group of coalition sets: a group of coalition sets corresponds to several sets of 
coalitions brought together in order to be computed an  transmitted collectively (for 
instance, several possible schedules). In the rest of this article, it will be referred to as 
a group of sets or simply a group. When an agent computes a group of equivalent sets, 
this means that it is indifferent regarding all the sets of coalitions in this group (for 
instance, it computes a group with those schedules that it prefers to others and that it 
cannot classify).  
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Context: a set of unspecified parameters which must be stable during a negotiation 
step. For instance, it may concern a date or any external parameter.  
 
Utility function: the utility function may be ordinal or cardinal. If it is cardinal, it 
associates a utility with a set of coalitions within a given context. If it is ordinal, it 
compares two sets in a given context. In this case, measuring the utility of a set means 
comparing it with a reference situation which will be the same one throughout the 
negotiation.  
 
Reference situation: In order for the agents to know if they have to accept a set of 
coalitions as a solution, they need to be able to compare it with what they are sure to 
obtain during the negotiation. This minimum is the reference situation. If no coalition 
has yet been formed, the reference situation is the situation where nobody does 
anything. If there are already coalitions, it is the current situation, with possibly some 
changes in order to take into account new information (cf. section 4.3.2). To be sure 
to find a solution after a negotiation, the reference situation needs to be feasible and to 
be the same for all the agents (a demonstration is proposed in section 4.3.3).  
 
Acceptable set: we consider that a set is acceptable for an agent if it is preferred or 
equivalent to the current reference situation.  
 
Pareto optimum: a Pareto optimum is a situation where it is not possible to 
improve the situation of an agent without deteriorating that of at least one other. 
Graphically, for two agents a situation is optimal if no other situation exists at the top 
right position of the situations considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of Pareto optimal solutions 
4 Coordination methods 
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Our first aim in defining this protocol is to solve the agent coalition formation 
problem without having to aggregate the preferences of the agent . Then, we extend 
this protocol to allow a dynamic and fast reorganiztion of these coalitions according 
to new changes in the multi-agent system.  
 
4.1 Presentation 
As we do not intend to aggregate the utilities of the agents, we seek a solution 
which is "objectively good", i.e. which may not be contested by any agent. A logical 
criterion likely to be accepted by all the agents is that we cannot increase the utility of 
an individual without deteriorating that of at least one other. If this does not happen, 
i.e. there is a situation such that we can increase the utility of an individual without 
deteriorating that of another, there is no reason nt to prefer this situation. The 
solution we seek must thus be a Pareto optimum. 
 
Which Pareto optimum should we choose? Now the problem is to compare the 
utilities of different agents. How should we choose between a schedule which is the 
first choice of a professor and another which is the first choice of a student? One 
solution is to avoid making a choice but to find a P reto optimum. This offers the 
advantage of reducing computations as agents do not have to compute all possible 
schedule. The only constraint is that it should be in the interest of each agent to accept 
this solution, therefore to prefer this solution to the initial situation. The first aim of 
our protocol is thus to find a Pareto optimum likely to be accepted by all the agents 
and as early as possible. To find a Pareto optimal situation is a first step. Extensions 
of this protocol to find a more equitable solution are under study (see for 
example(Aknine and Caillou, 2004)). But this is a necessary step, because finding a 
distributed way to compute a Pareto optimum without transferring or aggregating 
preferences is not trivial. 
 
4.1.1 Principle 
 
How is a Pareto optimum obtained?  
• The agent which initiates a negotiation seeks one or m re sets of 
coalitions it prefers (cf. section 5) and chooses an agent to which it sends 
them (cf. section 4.2.1). Then it seeks the set(s) that it would choose as a 
second choice and sends them to that agent, and so on, until there are no 
more sets at least equivalent to the current situation.  
• When an agent receives a group of sets, it evaluates them and sends them 
to the next agent sorted in decreasing order of preference.  
• When an agent receives a group of sets, if there is at least one set which is 
preferable or equivalent to the current situation and if all the agents have 
already taken part in the negotiation, the set of this group that it prefers is 
a Pareto optimum and may be used as a solution set for the negotiation. 
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For instance, let us consider two agents and seven sets of possible coalitions. Let 
E(U1;U2) be the relative utilities of agents a1 nd a2 for the set E. Having E0 as the 
initial situation, the seven possible sets are: E0(0;0); E1(0;10); E2(2;8); E3(4;8); 
E4(4;5); E5(-2;2); E6(10;-1) (cf. figure 1). Of these seven sets, three are Pareto optima 
(E1, E3 and E6). We represent these solutions on a plan according to the utility that 
they bring to each agent (cf. figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Describing all possible solutions in a utility space 
 
Agent a1 initiates the negotiation. It sorts all the acceptable sets for it into 
equivalent groups of sets (cf. figure 3): G1(E6); G2(E4;E3); G3(E2); G4(E0;E1). E5 is not 
sorted as the reference situation (E0) is better.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Group of sets of agent 1 
 
Groups G1, G2, G3 et G4 are acceptable for agent a1 s they correspond to a 
situation which is as satisfactory as the initial refe ence situation, or better. G1, G2, G3 
et G4 are sent in this order to the next agent. Thus, agent a2 starts by receiving G1 and 
evaluates it (cf. figure 4). Set E6 is unacceptable for the agent because it would bring a 
less satisfactory situation than the initial situation (figure 4). The agent does not send 
this set and waits for the rest. 
 
  Sub-optimal solution 
  Optimal solution 
 
U1 
U2 
E1 
E2 E3 
E4 
E5 
E6 
E0 
U
1 
E0 E2 
E3 
E4 E5 E6 
U1=
0 
G2 G1 G3 G4 
E1 
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Figure 4. First group for agent a2 
 
It receives G2 and sorts it into two sets (figure 5) in two groups G21(E3) and 
G22(E4). G21 is acceptable. As all the other agents have already p rticipated in the 
negotiation, agent a2 cannot send it. All the sets of G21 can thus be a solution. The 
agent must choose E3, which is Pareto optimal. It sends this set to agent a1 in order to 
inform it of the result of the negotiation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Second group for agent a2 
 
 
4.1.2 Algorithm 
 
The negotiation process is based on three phases: initialization of the negotiation 
and transfer of tasks, negotiation, transmission of the solution. We can distinguish the 
behavior of the agent which initiates the negotiation from the intermediate and final 
agents which take part in the negotiation. The order of the agents can differ from one 
negotiation to another and each agent can be in any position. However, the order must 
be stable during a given negotiation. The importance and influence of this order will 
be discussed in section 4.2. In short, this protocol can be seen as a distributed 
lexicographic search in a virtual common preference space (this problem is not trivial 
U
2 
E6 
U2 
=0 
U
2 
E3 
U2=
0 
E4 
G21 
G22 
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since no agent has a complete knowledge of this space, because the preferences are 
not transmitted between agents). 
 
4.1.2.1 Phase 1. Initialization of the negotiation and transfer of tasks 
 
Any agent can initiate the negotiation. This action ca  be initiated when a new task 
appears or when an agent modifies its preferences. The initiator agent informs the 
others that it begins a new negotiation and any agent which wants to begin another 
negotiation must wait until the end of the negotiation in progress. To avoid conflicts 
between two simultaneous requests, each agent sendsa confirmation. Each agent asks 
the other agents to send it their tasks, deduces the set of tasks to be performed and 
associates each one with a coalition. The initiator gent computes all possible sets of 
coalitions (cf. sections 4.1.3. and 5. regarding complexity), gathers them in a group of 
sets and sends this group to the agent which would initiate the negotiation. 
 
4.1.2.2 Phase 2 : Negotiation 
 
When an agent receives a group of sets, it sorts the ets in order of preference into 
homogeneous new groups of sets. In these groups, all sets are equivalent in terms of 
agent utility. The agent sorts only those sets thatare at least equivalent to the 
reference situation and the others sets are not considered. 
If the agent is not the last agent, it sends its new groups to the next agent in 
decreasing order of preference. If it is the last agent, and if this agent has created new 
groups because it has found acceptable sets, it considers that all the sets of the best 
new group are Pareto optima. It can thus choose one of them randomly and this will 
be the solution for the negotiation  
 
4.1.2.3 Phase 3: Transmission of the solution.  
Once the last agent has identified a Pareto optimal solution, it sends this set to the 
other agents which accept it as the solution of the negotiation (Remind that the goal of 
the distributed negotiation was to find a Pareto optimal solution). 
 
 
4.1.3 Importance of the choice of the next agent  
 
The order in which agents negotiate influences the result. The first agent is the one 
which has the strongest impact on the final solution as it is the first to choose the sets 
it prefers from among all the possible sets, and to send them to the following agents. 
The choice of the next negotiator agent is also very important.  
The first solution is to choose randomly among those which have not yet 
participated in the negotiation. However, to improve the computation time of the 
protocol, it is preferable to take the agent which appears the most often in the 
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computed sets. We assume that, since it takes part in many coalitions, this agent will 
be more interested in the alternatives which will be proposed than an agent which is 
less involved. It will thus sort the sets into several groups (it will possibly reject some 
of them if it considers them as unacceptable). The next negotiator agent will receive 
smaller groups which means that it will have less computing to do.  
The second solution consists in choosing the agents in a predefined order. This 
makes it possible to favor agents with high priority. This solution is very practical in 
many real applications, such as in drawing up schedules, where professors have 
priority over their students.  
A third solution is to let the agent choose the next agent which will maximize its 
utility. This optimization may be complex (each agent ignores preferences of others) 
but it gives more freedom to the agent who has to make a strategic decision. 
 
4.1.4 Parallel computation 
 
One advantage of the protocol is that agents evaluate and rank coalition sets in 
parallel (once first group of coalition sets is transferred). They do not rank the same 
group at the same time, but they work on different groups at the same time. 
For example, consider four agents A1, A2, A3 and A4. A1 computes groups in 
preference order G1 to Gn and sends them in this order to A2. 2 first receives G1. It 
evaluates acceptable sets in G1 and rank them in G11.. G1m. It sends them in this order 
to A3. While A3 is evaluating G11 (it builds groups G111 to G11k  with acceptable sets of 
G11 and sends them to A4),  A2 can work in parallel on G2 (and build G21 to G2m). 
Let us say that no coalition set in G11 is acceptable for A3. It will consider G12 and 
compute G121 to G12p. Note that the groups are received by each agent in a 
lexicographic order (for A3: G11, G12, …, G1m, G21, G22, …). As mentioned in section 
4.1.2, the selected Pareto optimum is chosen thru a distributed lexicographic search in 
a virtual common preference space.  
This example also illustrates the importance of cooperative agents: if an agent 
makes the strategic choice to “lie”, which here would mean to consider and evaluate a 
group Gi while a group Gj has been received before, there is no assurance to obtain a 
Pareto optimum anymore. Agents may have opposite obj ctive, but they have to 
respect the order required by the protocol.     
4.1.5 Using undeveloped coalitions to improve the computation time of the 
algorithm  
 
As the first agent starts by computing all the possible combinations for all the 
tasks, this process implies a huge the computation time of and volume of data sent to 
the following agents. A way to improve the computation time without decreasing 
information quality, and thus the result and the properties of the algorithm, is to use 
and transmit undeveloped coalitions, i.e. the tasks for which all possible coalitions 
have not yet been computed. If an agent receives an undeveloped coalition in a set 
and this coalition does not affect its utility (if it joins the coalition or not), it leaves it 
aside and does not compute it. If it does affect the utility, it computes all possible 
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combinations for the corresponding task. Considering our assumption, the result of 
this computation is the same whatever the agent which does it.  
 
For instance, in drawing up schedules, a professor agent which begins the 
negotiation will only develop coalitions related to classes it is likely to give, because 
they are the only ones which can modify its utility. More precisely, let us assume that 
there are two classes c1 and c2 (c1 can be only given by professor p1 and c2 can only be 
given by professor p2); two possible time slots; a group of students (s1) and let us also 
consider that the utility of each professor depends only on their own classes. If p1 
begins the negotiation without using the undeveloped coalitions, it must compute and 
evaluate all 9 possible sets (3 possible coalitions f r c1 (s1 and p1 with two possible 
time slots, plus the course not given) multiplied by 3 possible coalitions for c2). It 
classifies them in groups and then sends them to the following agent (let us say p2). 
By using the undeveloped coalitions, p1 has only 3 sets to evaluate (made up each 
time of one of the three possibilities for c1 and not specifying anything for c2), that it 
classifies in groups and sends to p2 which is asked to develop c2 (see another example 
in section 5.2.1) 
 
This method produces better results if the agent’s utility depends only of few tasks. 
However, if an agent’s utility depends on all the tasks, it will be asked to develop all 
possible sets when it takes part in a negotiation. 
In our protocol, only a few changes are necessary in order to use undeveloped 
coalitions. At the end of the first phase, the initiator agent sends to the agent which 
will begin the negotiation a group of sets containing one set of undeveloped 
coalitions. In the second phase, when the agent receiv s a group, for each set of this 
group and for each undeveloped coalition of this set, the agent checks if the 
corresponding task can influence its utility. If so, it computes all possible coalitions 
corresponding to this task, adds the new sets of coalitions to the sets it must evaluate 
and removes the set which contained the undeveloped coalition.  
 
4.2 Formal analysis of our model 
 
4.2.1 Why is the solution Pareto optimal? 
 
How can we be sure that the first set received by the last negotiator agent is Pareto 
optimal, as all possible sets have not yet been evaluated by all the agents? A 
demonstration is necessary. 
 
Proposition 1. 
 
When an agent receives a group of sets, if: 
- all other agents have already participated in the negotiation, 
  13 
- at least one of the received sets is acceptable, i.e. it is at least equivalent to the 
reference situation, 
- none of the sets previously received during the negotiation satisfies the two 
conditions below, 
 
the acceptable set(s) S that it prefers in the receiv d group is/are Pareto optimal and 
can be used as a solution for the negotiation.  
 
Demonstration. 
 
If S is not Pareto optimal, this would mean that there is a set S’ which is preferable 
for one of the agents that shall be called (ai). S’ is at least equivalent to S for all the 
other agents. In this case, all the agents which were b fore ai in the negotiation have 
transmitted S’ either in the same group as S (if they are indifferent), or in a previous 
group (if there is at least one agent which prefers S’ to S).  
 
If ai receives S’ before S, it had necessarily sent it (since S is a solution, S is 
acceptable for all agents, therefore S’, which is at le st equivalent to S, is also 
acceptable for all agents). As the groups are computed completely before starting with 
the next group, ai returns S’ before computing S. The following agents should thus 
receive S’ before S. Since S’ is also acceptable, th y send it to the following agent 
and so on until the last one which will therefore find it acceptable and thus select it as 
a solution, which is impossible since S has been selected.  
If ai receives S and S’ in the same group (all previous agent have considered S 
equivalent to S’), ai should send S’ before S as it prefers S’ to S. As in the previous 
case, agents following ai should receive S’ before S. Since S’ is acceptable, th y 
should then send it to the next negotiator agent, until the last agent which should also 
find it acceptable and should therefore select it as a solution for the negotiation, which 
is also impossible since S has been selected.  
 
Consequently, it is impossible for a set S’ to exist such that an agent prefers S’ to S 
and that all the other agents find it at least equivalent to S. Therefore S is Pareto 
optimal. 
 
 
4.2.2 Why are agents sure to find a solution? 
 
The first optimum S found is the first set which is received by the last negotiator 
agent and that this agent considers acceptable. Why is there always an optimum? A 
demonstration is thus necessary. 
 
Proposition 2.  
The protocol always provides at least one solution to the problem.  
 
Demonstration. 
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For each agent, the acceptability criterion is thate set is at least as satisfactory as 
the reference situation. However this reference situation is the same for all and 
belongs to the possible sets. Therefore all the agents necessarily find this situation 
acceptable and will forward it. Thus, there will alw ys be at least one acceptable set 
which will reach the last negotiator agent. If the reference situation is the first set to 
arrive, it is an optimum and also the solution for the negotiation. If another acceptable 
set had arrived first, this one would provide the solution.  
 
We can note that reference situation is here considered as “acceptable” for all the 
agents. If it is not (i.e. if the initial situation is not acceptable for at least one agent), 
the protocol is still working: the agents just have to consider the reference situation as 
the “worse acceptable situation”, and if the final so ution of the negotiation is this 
reference situation, this means that there is no solution to the problem. 
 
4.3 Dynamic restructuring of coalitions 
 
4.3.1 Principle 
 
Our protocol provides a solution, i.e. a set of coaliti ns with the initial conditions 
(utility functions, a set of tasks and a context). What happens if a change occurs in 
one of these conditions, for instance if a task is added or removed, or if an agent 
modifies its utility function? In current protocols (Aknine, Pinson, and Shakun, 
2004b, Sandholm and others, 1999, Shehory and Kraus, 1998), all the computation 
must be redone to find a new solution to the problem. We propose a more efficient 
solution which use the results obtained in the current situation. It adds new 
information to the previous conditions, instead of c mpletely replace them.  
A simple means to use earlier computation is to start from the current solution. 
Instead of evaluating the different sets compared to the initial situation where no 
agent does anything, the agents will evaluate the new solutions compared to the 
current solution. As this solution is at least equivalent to the initial situation for all the 
agents (since it is Pareto optimal), it is difficult to find a similar or better one. Thus, 
fewer sets and groups of sets will be forwarded and evaluated. This will accelerate the 
problem-solving process.  
 
The change which has initiated the renegotiation may of course affect the utility of 
the agents, this is why those agents must reevaluate the sets that they have computed. 
Computation time is lower because the new reference situation has a higher utility 
level, which implies less acceptable sets to compute.. 
The new reference situation must remain feasible and identical for all agents in 
spite of the new information. Thus it is not the current situation which is used as the 
reference situation but the modified current situaton, in which all the changes have 
been taken into account. For instance, for an agent which leaves, the reference 
situation will be the current set of coalitions without this agent. For a removed task, it 
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will be the current set of coalitions minus the coalition corresponding to the task. If it 
is impossible to obtain a new reference situation that is feasible, the initial reference 
situation (no one does anything) is used (and agents come back in the non-dynamic 
configuration).  
 
 
4.3.2 Why is the solution Pareto optimal? 
The demonstration of the first proposition (cf. section 4.4.1) is still valid: when the 
last agent receives a group of sets, if it has not yet received an acceptable set and the 
best set S of the received group is acceptable, set S is a solution of the negotiation. 
Moreover, there is no other set S’ which is at least equivalent to S for all the agents, 
and preferable for at least one of them, otherwise the last agent would have received it 
before receiving S and this set would have been selected as a solution.  
4.3.3 Why do the agents always find a solution? 
 
The demonstration of the second proposition (cf. section 4.4.2) is still valid: the 
reference situation is the same for all agents, acceptable by all agents (as it is 
compared with itself) and also feasible. Thus, there is at least one set (the reference 
situation) which will be sent by each agent to the next agent and which will be the 
solution if it is the first to be received by the last agent.  
 
 
5 Behavior models of the agents 
 
How do the agents process to find the sets of coaliti ns to send to the other agents? 
The answer to this question has a great impact on the computational computation time 
of the solution. It is appropriate to analyze in detail the various possible methods in 
order to select the most appropriate one with the minimum computation.  
 
5.1 Objective 
 
The aim of each agent is to build new groups of homogeneous coalitions from a 
group of sets received from the previous negotiator gent and to classify these new 
groups in order of preference. This means that the agent must be indifferent to all the 
sets of the group, it must prefer these sets to all the sets of the lower groups and prefer 
all the sets of the higher groups to them. Heuristics can be used to find the best group 
according to the context and the application. This improves the computation time of 
the algorithms. 
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The simplest solution is that the first negotiator agent computes all the possible sets 
and then each agent makes an exhaustive classification of all the possible sets. The 
advantage of this solution is that it is simple, but it leads to a high computation time, 
especially for the first agent. Other search methods can serve to improve the 
computation time and to distribute the calculations among the various agents. Even if 
the theoretical worst-case complexity remains the same, experimentations shows a 
much better average case (see section 7). 
 
5.2 Using heuristics to reduce the computation time of the behavior of the 
agents  
 
To illustrate these heuristics, we will use a simple example with one teacher-agent 
(P1), two student-agents (E1, E2), two classes for each student (four coalitions in each 
coalition set), and four time slots (H1, H2, H3, H4). The total number of possible 
coalition sets is 54=625 (5 for the four time slots and the not-given case). 
 
5.2.1 First heuristic: Using undeveloped coalitions 
The method proposed using undeveloped coalitions (presented in section 4.1.3) 
reduces the calculations and the volume of the information transferred while 
preserving the ease of calculation by the agents.  
Applied to our example, the first student begins the negotiation. It simply evaluates 
coalitions sets by adding the hours of its classes (for example if it has a class at H2 
and one at H4, it evaluate each set with these parameters with a value of 2+4=6) and 0 
if a course is not given. Using undeveloped coalitions, agent E1 has only to develop 
coalitions corresponding to its classes. It will have a total of 5*5=25 sets to send to 
the next agent. Figure 6 represents these sets and their evaluation. It first develops 
coalition corresponding to its first class and obtain the 5 partially developed sets 
EnsPart1 to EnsPart5. Then, it develops coalition 2 and obtains the 25 coalitions sets 
Ens1 to Ens25. It evaluates them and places them into groups. The first group G1 
contains its preferred sets, Ens14 and Ens18, both with a utility of 7. Next group 
contains Ens9 and Ens17. Last group will contains all sets with a utility of 0, 
equivalent to the situation where no course is given. 
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((nd)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((P1,E1,H1)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((P1,E1,H1)(P1E1H1)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H1)(P1E1H2)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H1)(P1E1H3)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H1)(P1E1H4)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H1)(-)(nd)(nd))
U(Ens1)= -1
U(Ens2)= 3
U(Ens3)= 4
U(Ens4)= 5
U(Ens5)= 0
Umax(EnsPart1)= 5
Uest(EnsPart1)= 1
((P1,E1,H2)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((P1,E1,H2)(P1E1H1)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H2)(P1E1H2)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H2)(P1E1H3)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H2)(P1E1H4)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H2)(-)(nd)(nd))
U(Ens6)= 3
U(Ens7)= -1
U(Ens8)= 5
U(Ens9)= 6
U(Ens10)= 0
Umax(EnsPart2)= 6
Uest(EnsPart2)= 2
((P1,E1,H3)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((P1,E1,H3)(P1E1H1)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H3)(P1E1H2)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H3)(P1E1H3)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H3)(P1E1H4)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H3)(-)(nd)(nd))
U(Ens11)= 4
U(Ens12)= 5
U(Ens13)= -1
U(Ens14)= 7
U(Ens15)= 0
Umax(EnsPart3)= 7
Uest(EnsPart3)= 3
((P1,E1,H4)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((P1,E1,H4)(P1E1H1)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H4)(P1E1H2)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H4)(P1E1H3)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H4)(P1E1H4)(nd)(nd))
((P1,E1,H4)(-)(nd)(nd))
U(Ens16)= 5
U(Ens17)= 6
U(Ens18)= 7
U(Ens19)= -1
U(Ens20)= 0
Umax(EnsPart4)= 8
Uest(EnsPart4)= 4
((-)(nd)(nd)(nd)) ((-)(P1E1H1)(nd)(nd))
((-)(P1E1H2)(nd)(nd))
((-)(P1E1H3)(nd)(nd))
((-)(P1E1H4)(nd)(nd))
((-)(-)(nd)(nd))
U(Ens21)= 0
U(Ens22)= 0
U(Ens23)= 0
U(Ens24)= 0
U(Ens25)= 0
Umax(EnsPart5)= 4
Uest(EnsPart5)= 0
 
Figure 6. Development of all coalition sets for student-agent E1 using undeveloped 
coalitions (nd) for the two student-agent E2 classes 
 
5.2.2 Second heuristic: Tests of intermediate acceptability  
In order to reduce the number of iterations, a comple entary solution would be to 
test if an (incompletely developed) set can be potentially preferred to the reference 
situation. If this is not the case, it will not be n cessary to develop it and this branch 
of the exploration tree can be pruned. These tests are especially useful during the 
restructuring of coalitions. The reference situation would then be the current situation 
that is likely to be very acceptable for the agent. This agent can easily set aside many 
sets which will not give a better solution, especially if the agent prefers not to change 
its situation. All the solutions which begin to move away from the current solution are 
thus quickly dropped because the agent will necessarily prefer the reference situation 
to them.  
In the example, the student agent will use the intermediate evaluation 
Umax(EnsPart) which evaluates the maximum utility reachable by the set. In this 
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case, if the reference situation is evaluated 7, the agent will know it is useless to 
develop EnsPart1, EnsPart2 and EnsPart5 and it will just concentrate on the two other 
situations, computing only 5 intermediate evaluations instead of 15 final evaluations. 
 
5.2.3 Third heuristic: Search limited to the best group 
The aim of an agent is to send to the next negotiator agent groups of sets sorted in 
decreasing order of satisfaction. If the solution is in group Gi, all groups Gj with j>i 
have been evaluated, classified and probably developed unnecessarily. It would be 
useful to only evaluate the sets of G1, then those of G2, and so on. The problem is 
that agents do not know in advance what will be the degree of satisfaction associated 
with the best group. However, in order to evaluate only the members of G1, it is 
necessary to know the satisfaction associated to them, and therefore to have already 
evaluated them! Even if it is impossible to compute only the sets of the group G1, we 
can try to gradually limit computations to the useful sets. To do so, the agent needs a 
lower limit, which is the best evaluated set at the current computation time, and it will 
only develop the sets which are at least equal to this limit. Each time a set, even an 
incompletely developed one, is evaluated and the evaluation is higher than the limit, it 
becomes the new limit. On the contrary, when an evaluated set does not reach the 
limit but is nevertheless acceptable in a weaker group, it is kept and added to a group 
which will be used as a starting group to compute the following groups.  
In the example, the agent first develops the first coalition and obtains the 5 
partially developed sets EnsPart1 to EnsPart5. It chooses one randomly, say EnsPart3 
and develops it. It obtains Ens11 to Ens15. The best s t is Ens14, rated 7. The best 
group has so a minimum rating of 7 and the agent search s only sets with a minimum 
rating of 7. It uses the intermediate evaluation Umax for each remaining partial set 
and consider only those which have a potential rating of 7, in this case only EnsPart4 
(Umax(EnsPart4)=8). It develops EnsPart4, adds Ens18 to the actual best group G1 
and has terminated to create this group. It can thus send it to the next agent who can 
begin its evaluation. In parallel, first agent continues its search with remaining sets to 
find the second best group. 
 
5.2.4 Fourth heuristic: limited search using intermediate evaluation  
In the previous case, the order in which the coaliti ns are developed is of great 
importance. The faster the best set is reached, the fast r it becomes the reference 
situation and the less the other sets are developed (b cause the reference situation 
becomes rarely reached). This is thus useful to set up an intermediate evaluation 
procedure of the sets to be developed in order to compute first of all the set which 
seems most likely to generate sets bringing great satisfaction.  
In the example, This means that instead of choosing ra domely between partially 
developed sets, the agent uses an evaluation function (Uest) to choose the best set 
considering its information at this time. Here, it will choose to develop in first 
EnsPart4, which has the best evaluation because the only developed class is in H4, 
which is its preferred slot. It will then find the best group rating quicker than having 
chosen randomly for example the EnsPart5 set.  
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5.2.5 Prospective search.  
In order to better use the utility function, instead of starting from an empty set and 
developing it, an agent may immediately use the knowledge of its utility function and 
the tasks to be achieved in order to deduce the best sets. If the number of possible sets 
is high, this solution can be advantageous since in this case the complexity does not 
depend of the number of possible sets but depends of the type of utility function of the 
agent. This method can give far more effective results but the procedure for each type 
of utility function needs to be rewritten.  
 
5.2.6 Non-exhaustive methods 
Using the utility function or developing the possible coalitions, the agent can make 
approximations in order to have much faster results, even if it is not certain to obtain 
the best possible results. Using this method to develop the coalitions, the agent can 
decide not to explore the undeveloped sets - which do not offer very interesting 
prospects −even if one of their developments may theoretically give the best solution. 
The final solution will thus be obtained quicker, but this solution would not be proved 
to be Pareto optimal.  
6 Implementation and tests  
 
To illustrate our model, we have implemented a teaching scheduling application 
system using the utility function of the professors and the students. The utility 
function has different variables: for each day, the time of the first class, the time of 
the last class, the number of hours per day, the number of classes not given, the 
number of compulsory classes not given for each agent, the number of changes 
compared to the current schedule, the total number of hours per week. Given the 
number of parameters, three profiles have been defined to simplify the choices: 
morning, afternoon and grouped (it prefers to group its classes on a minimum number 
of days). These profiles correspond to values of arbitr ry parameters used for the 
tests. Because it is easier for implementation purposes, we have chosen to compute a 
utility function in order to valuate the preferences. Even so we get cardinal values, our 
proposed protocol only needs ordinal utility functions. 
 
6.1 Description of the multi-agent system 
 
6.1.1 Architecture of the system 
 
The multi-agent system is composed of two principal object-oriented classes: the 
agent and the environment. The environment aims at identifying the newcomers, at 
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carrying out a total follow-up of the system and at enabling the user to intervene if 
needed. During their creation, the agents obtain the IP addresses of the other agents 
which they then use to communicate directly with them. Our aim is to build a generic 
multi-agent system that can be used easily to redefine an environment and agents 
adapted to the field to which we want to apply them, and to define tasks, actions or 
behaviors of the agents (maximization of collective utility, individual utility, etc.). 
The system is made up of several executable programs. The goal is to make the 
environment and each individual agent really autonomous entities.  
 
6.1.2 Communications 
 
The agents and the environment communicate by TCP/IP. The various agents can 
thus be distributed on different computers and communicate in a local area network or 
by Internet. This distribution of the resources allows a greater speed and a real 
parallelism between actions and deliberations. Agents subscribe to the environment, 
which IP address must be known by all. At the time of their subscription, the 
environment sends the agents the addresses of the other agents in the multi-agent 
system and informs the others of the presence of the newcomers. All the agents thus 
have all the addresses and can communicate with eac other. To communicate, the 
agents and the environment use object messages, which are structured vectors so that 
they can be created, sent and received. All the agents and the environment have a 
message processing program permanently on standby so that these messages can be 
received and processed immediately.  
 
6.1.3 Description of the environment  
 
At the beginning, the environment agent is activated and then the agents start the 
negotiation process. This allows:  
• The user to intervene in the system as a whole. 
• To inform the user of the global state of the system.  
• To register the entrance of a new agent, to provide it with information 
concerning the current state of the multi-agent sysem (addresses of the 
other agents) and to inform the other agents of its arrival by providing 
them with its address.  
 
6.2 Description of the agents 
 
We assume that an agent is an autonomous program which behaves for its own 
interest. It is mainly characterized by its action and reasoning mechanisms and by its 
knowledge structure. The agent has knowledge about the various types of task that 
exist in the domain considered and about the various types of action. In addition to 
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this knowledge about itself, the agent has knowledge about the other agents. This 
knowledge is provided to it by the other agents when they join the system (or when 
this agent itself joins the group, if the others were in the system before it) or when 
they modify one of their characteristics (like adding a course to or withdrawing a 
course from the list of capabilities of a professor, in the case of our application). The 
action mechanisms (the behavior) are free. Just like the environment, the agent uses a 
process which allows it to wait for possible communications from the other agents or 
from the environment.  
 
6.2.1 Negotiation process of the agent 
 
Although this part of the agent is always reusable for other applications, this 
module knows the coalition formation protocol and can thus negotiate so as to reach a 
Pareto-optimal situation.  
 
6.2.1.1 Structure 
 
The agent is made up of three processes, all of which are activated during 
initialization: 
• An action process, which carries out the actions that t e agent planned. 
• A negotiation process, which is activated as soon as a new negotiation 
starts. 
• A communication process, which waits to receive messages from the 
other agents or the environment, and consequently communicates with the 
other processes.  
 
6.2.1.2 Managing communications 
 
The negotiation process of the agent manages the negotiations in order to form 
coalitions. For that, it knows a certain number of specific messages: “Initialization” 
and “Update” are messages sent by the user or by an agent. “Initialization” message 
starts a new coalition formation process, “Update” enables to modify current 
coalitions. The agent starts by warning the other agents of the new negotiation (with 
the message “New Negotiation”, to which they answer by “Confirmation New 
Negotiation”). Then it begins the negotiation and gradually sends the groups of sets of 
coalitions to the following agent (message “Negotiation in Progress” to which the 
agent answers “Evaluation Ended” each time that it has finished processing a group).  
 
6.2.1.3 Initializing a new negotiation 
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When an agent receives a group of sets from another agent, it saves these sets in a 
vector of sets which will be analyzed with the process used for analyzing the group. 
When the agent initializes a new negotiation, it places, in the same vector a single 
initial set in which no coalition is developed and it fires the same analysis procedure. 
In order to initialize a negotiation it is sufficient to receive an empty set from the 
others. In all cases, the agent initializes the groups where it will classify the sets 
according to the satisfaction that these sets provide it.  
 
6.2.1.4 Searching for coalitions 
 
To classify the sets in groups, the agent has several methods which are described in 
section 5.2. The first, the basic method, has been improved thanks to the addition of 
intermediate tests and by developing only necessary coalitions. The second, the search 
method limited to the best group, means major modificat ons to the algorithm while 
moving from breadth search to an in-depth search. This is because the agents must 
obtain completely developed sets as quickly as possible in order to be able to evaluate 
them. However, in the basic method such sets are only obtained at the end, when the 
agent simultaneously develops the last coalition, fr all the intermediate sets. The 
third method, which limits itself to the best group with intermediate tests, improves 
the preceding method by carrying out intermediate tests more quickly to find a set of 
the best group.  
 
6.2.2 Student and professor agents  
 
The utility function returns a complete result which relates, however, to the 
reference situation, the utility of which (absolute, measured by the Ucomp variable) is 
computed at the beginning of each negotiation.  
 
The various parameters of the utility function are s follows:  
 
• The time the day starts: for each day, the agent allots a utility to the time 
of the first class.  
• The time the day ends: for each day, the agent allots a utility to the time 
the last class ends.  
• Numbers of hours of the day: for each day, the agent allots a utility to the 
number of classes are given.  
 
Each of these partial utility functions is of the following form:  
 
 
 
 
1 
0 
valmin optmin optmax valmax 
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Valmin: value below which the utility is null  
Optmin and optmax: limits between which the utility is maximum  
Valmax: value above which the utility is null  
Criterion: time the day starts, time the day ends, Numbers of hours of the day 
Figure 6. Partial utility according to the value of the selected criterion  
 
For each day, the agent computes the weight of these three functions (d(j,s), f(j,s), 
n(j,s)) according to its own coefficients (pd, pf, pn) based on the criteria it considers 
more important. The agent computes the average of these daily utilities. The professor 
agent has a fourth criterion: the total number of hurs of classes in a week. It 
computes the weekly average of this criterion (t(s)), which is then weighted using (Pt) 
with the preceding daily average. The agent then seeks the number of classes nbtt 
which are not given in the evaluated sets. It uses an aversion coefficient ct for the 
classes which are not given. It multiplies the interm diate utility by this coefficient to 
the power nbtt. In the same way, the agent seeks the number of classes it must attend 
(tasks which are allocated to it at the beginning) but which are not given btp. It uses 
a second coefficient cp to the power nbtp and that it multiplies by the preceding result. 
Lastly, the agent seeks the number of classes nbch which have moved compared to 
the initial situation in its timetable. It uses a third coefficient cc to the power nbch and 
that it multiplies by the preceding result. It then uses an absolute result from which it 
subtracts the utility of the current reference situation Ucomp in order to obtain a 
relative result.  
 
For the student agent, the formula corresponding to these calculations is:  
 
Equation 1. The relative utility of a student agent associated with a set of coalitions  
 
The utility function of the professor agent is defin d as: 
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Equation 2. The relative utility of a professor agent associated with a set of coalitions  
 
At the end, the agent checks if there are incompatibilities in the timetable (for 
instance, two classes programmed at the same time) or some violated constraints (a 
class starting before the minimum value or after th maximum value, etc.). If it is the 
case, it returns the value –1. If not, it returns the computed utility. All these 
parameters can be modified individually by each agent. Given their number, three 
profiles have been defined to simplify the choices by default: morning, afternoon and 
grouped (the agent prefers to group its classes on a minimum number of days).  
6.3 Operational process 
 
The first step consists in executing the environment agent. Professor and student 
agents can then be added, either directly with the assistance of the environment, or by 
a separate program, possibly on another computer on the etwork.  
The various functions available for each agent are:  
• Redefinition of capabilities and utility function. For both professors and 
students, all the parameters of the utility function can be modified. For the 
professors, the courses in which they are qualified to teach can also be 
defined.  
• Modification of the search method. For each agent, its model can be 
chosen by defining the method that it will use to search for the sets of 
coalitions. 
• Addition or deletion of classes. For the students, ew classes can be added 
and the existing ones can be removed.  
 
Once all the agents are created and utility functios are defined, an agent can starts 
the initialization phase of the negotiation in order to obtain a set of timetables, i.e. a 
solution. Other agents or other tasks may then be add d and utility functions may be 
modified. An agent may then start the update step will seek a new solution starting 
from the current situation.  
7 Evaluation results 
The proposed solutions were tested through simulation. To understand these tests, 
remind the objectives of this work:  
 
• To propose a protocol in order to form Pareto optimal coalitions.  
• To propose a protocol which enables a dynamic reorganization of 
coalitions. 
• To propose heuristics to search for coalition groups so as to accelerate the 
negotiation.  
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7.1 Coalition formation and optimality of the result 
 
How should such a protocol be evaluated? We cannot check if the utility function 
is maximal, as we assume that the multi-agent system has several utility functions that 
are incomparable. We have checked that during the tests we always obtain a result 
and that this result is a Pareto optimum (as proved in sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.2). We 
have analyzed the performance of the protocol by observing several parameters: the 
number of messages exchanged, the size of these messages (the number of coalition 
sets they contain) and the number of coalition setsthat have been evaluated. The 
number of messages exchanged between the agents is independent of the search 
method strategy. However, their size depends on the use of undeveloped coalitions. 
As for the number of evaluated sets, it depends very much on the search method used. 
The basic method systematically evaluates all the possible sets whereas the heuristics 
proposed seeks to reduce the number of these sets in order to obtain the result quicker. 
Four of these heuristics have been implemented. The heuristics which gave the best 
results and which are used in the experiments describ d consists in seeking only the 
best group by doing intermediate tests as soon as pos ible in order to identify the 
value of the best group. 
 
In the following, we will analyze these factors on a simple example using 4 agents 
(2 professors, 2 groups of students) and 2 classes. Each group attends two classes, i.e. 
there are four tasks in the system). Several experiments have been done with more 
agents (for more details see (Caillou, 2000)). In this example, we consider the 
schedule for two days, with eight possible time slots per day. We vary the profile of 
each agent (morning, afternoon, grouped) to obtain he average, maximum and 
minimum of the results. Students attends two classes, each one must be placed in one 
of the 16 time slots (or not to be placed if it is not given, so we have 16+1 cases to 
consider) with only one possible professor for each class. Thus, there are 174, i.e. 
83,521 possible schedules. The order in which the negotiations proceed is as follows: 
student s1 starts the negotiation, then student s2, professor p1 and professor p2 ends the 
negotiation. The last agent does not send any messag  as it just waits to receive a set 
which is appropriate for it and then sends it to the other agents as the solution for the 
negotiation.  
 
Only messages related to groups are counted (they ar  more frequent and 
especially voluminous as they contain the sets which will be evaluated). The number 
of messages sent depends very much on the precision of the utility function of the 
agents. If agents have very precise preferences, thy will distribute the sets among 
many small-sized groups and will send many messages. W  choose agent utilities 
with one hundred levels, therefore there is a maximum of 100 messages sent by the 
first agent (the second can thus send a maximum of 10,000 because it can divide each 
group received into 100 other groups). The number of messages sent is summarized in 
figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Number of messages exchanged during a negotiation with 4 agents and 4 
tasks 
 
The number of messages sent varies considerably according to the incompatibility 
of the preferences of the agents. For instance, a morning profile student will seek 
morning classes in priority. If the professor has an afternoon profile, it will consider 
these schedules unacceptable. Consequently, the stud nt will have to send other 
propositions which it finds less appropriate. On the contrary, if all agents accept the 
first propositions, only one message per agent is necessary (minimal case). The total 
size of the messages sent (figure 8) makes it possible to measure network obstruction. 
This size, measured with the number of sets, must be compared with the 83,521 
possible sets. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Total size of messages sent (measured by number of sets) during a negotiation 
with 4 agents and 4 tasks 
 
The agent which sends most sets and messages is student s2 for two reasons: (1) 
student s1 sends it the sets corresponding to its two classes according to its 
preferences; (2) student s2 computes all the possible combinations of its own classes 
in each of these sets. Then it sends these combinations in decreasing order of 
preference to professor a1 until there are no more acceptable sets to send and if no 
solution has been found. At this moment, student s1 sends it a second message and the 
negotiation continues.  
 
The number of evaluated sets makes it possible to measure the effectiveness of the 
heuristic search of the best group. If the basic method is used, the first agent would 
simply evaluate all 83521 possible sets and would send them classified to the 
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following agent.  Figure 9 shows that the maximum number evaluated set il less than 
15000 and the average number is less than 5000. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Number of evaluated sets of coalitions during a negotiation with 4 agents and 4 
tasks 
 
7.2 Dynamic restructuring of coalitions 
 
The purpose of dynamic restructuring of the coalitions is to give a result that is as 
satisfactory as the basic protocol but faster, which is possible because the algorithm 
uses information drawn from the preceding negotiatin by taking the previous 
solution as a new reference situation. The result will probably not be the same than 
the results obtained, if the initial protocol had been applied, but the result is always a 
Pareto optimum.  
  
We have studied the effect of adding new classes to the previous situation in terms 
of the number of sets evaluated and transmitted. We gradually added 4 classes to 
students 1 and 2. The size of the messages sent duri g a negotiation is indicated in 
figure 10.  
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Figure 10. Number of evaluated sets (i.e. size of message sent) during a negotiation with 4 
agents and classes varying from 4 to 8 
The first negotiation (4 classes) used the basic protocol, whereas the other four are 
restructurings from the previous situation. The number of sets sent and evaluated must 
be compared with the total number of possible sets. It varies between 80,000 for 4 
classes to 7.109 for 8 classes. The average size of the messages sent during these 
additions is indicated in figure 12. 
 
During the formation of the coalitions corresponding to the four initial tasks, we 
showed that the total number of sets sent was on average 1,308 which implies that the 
total number of evaluated sets corresponds to 5.5% of the total number of sets of 
possible coalitions (83,521). During the dynamic restructuring of coalitions, due to 
the addition of the 6th class, we observed that the total number of evaluated sets is 40 
which gives the total number of evaluated sets corresponds to 0.00085% of the total 
number of possible coalitions.  
The number of sets sent and the number of sets evaluated is related not to the total 
number of tasks carried out but to two parameters: he number of tasks the agents fail 
to perform (because of incompatible preferences) and the number of new tasks. The 
effect is cumulative, which explains why the number of sets sent gradually increases. 
For instance, if the 6th class has not been assigned, this affects the number of sets sent 
after the addition of the 7th and the 8th classes because agent 1 tries again each time to 
assign the 6th class (which is useful, as it may happen that in future negotiations a new 
class may modify the utility of the agents). 
 
7.3 Comparison of the agent heuristics 
 
The number of sets evaluated (figure 10) is here vey low compared to the number 
of possible sets (on average 1% of the basic protocol and between 4.10-4% and 6.10-
6% for the restructurings (figure 11 and 12)). However, the use of the basic protocol 
would have led to the computation and evaluation of all the possible sets before 
sending the groups of acceptable sets. The choice of a g od heuristics to search for 
the best group is thus fundamental so that the search time is acceptable. The heuristics 
which gave the best results are described in section 5.2 and consist in seeking only the 
best group by carrying out intermediate tests as soon as possible in order to identify 
the value of the best group. Using this heuristics enables to obtain the following 
number of evaluations (cf. figure 11) during the reorganizations carried out previously 
by the agents:  
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Figure 11. Number of evaluated sets of coalitions during a negotiation with 4 agents and 
classes varying from 4 to 8 
Related to the total number of possible sets, we obtained the results presented in 
figure 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Percentage of valuated sets of coalitions for 4 agents and classes varying from 4 
to 8 (logarithmic scale) 
8 Related work  
8.1 Theoretical origins 
 
The use of coalition formation models is highly adapted to complex projects 
requiring the intervention of several agents selectd from among a set of available 
ones. All the characteristics, even those related to the concept of an agent (an 
autonomous system with needs which can be represented i  the form of a utility 
function), are such that scientific research in many fields deals with problems 
referring more or less directly to the coalition formation problem. Some of these 
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fields, such game theory, are already being used int nsively in recent developments of 
multi-agent systems. Considering these different fields gives an overview of the 
problem and the various analytical approaches, which leads to original methods for 
coalition formation adapted to software and hardware agents.  
 
Game theory has already addressed the question of coalition formation. It has 
provided the concepts used in MAS for the analysis of this problem (typology of the 
problems, solutions, equilibrium, utility functions). Through power indices, it is 
possible to compute the real influence of an agent in a coalition. Game theory 
provides methods of calculation to define the best coalitions in various types of 
problem. A good synthesis of the analysis of coalitions in game theory can be found 
in (Kahan and Rapoport, 1984). Its application to multi-agent systems has been 
originally studied by Sandholm (Sandholm, 1996). Game theory has been at the origin 
of the majority of recent developments (Sandholm and others, 1999, Sen and Dutta, 
2000). The limits of its use are related both to the underlying assumptions (the agents 
are generally considered as perfectly rational) andto its aim (game theory focuses 
generally on the value of the optimal solution and not on the most efficient method to 
reach that solution, never on the most efficient dis ributed method). 
 
Economic theory, especially microeconomic theory, is concerned with a research 
topic that is very similar to that of multi-agent systems: autonomous agents, 
considered as imperfectly rational and having needs modeled using a utility function. 
Many economic concepts can be used to address the coalition formation problem in 
MAS: the Pareto optimum, the maximization of the individual utility as a means. Our 
proposed protocol is grounded on these economical concepts (Caillou, Aknine, and 
Pinson, 2002a).  
 
Sociological theory can also be useful to understand the coalition formation 
problem. Coalitions are groups of agents and these groups are not formed 
independently of their environment. The “Society”, in which they move plays a 
significant role in their choices: the presence of a third party (gendarme, state or 
program) may guarantee confidence. In the same way, the presence of social 
standards can accelerate or improve the formation of coalitions. Work like that of 
Shoham and Tennenholz (Shoham and Tennenholz, 1998) studied the influence of 
social standards and their emergence in a multi-agent system.  
 
8.2 Multi-agent coordination models 
 
The coalition formation problem has been studied in multi-agents domain since 
1994  (Ketchpel, 1994). This model does not solve however the problem in all cases. 
Even in the cases where this algorithm finds coaliti ns, it does not always find 
coalitions of the desired size (Aknine, Pinson, and Shakun, 2004b). (Shehory and 
Kraus, 1998) proposed a model which is now considered by the community as the 
“basic model”.  
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Since then, most current protocols address the same problem while making 
improvements from this basic model at different levels of their solution. The main 
distinction is between improvements made to the methods, by preserving agents with 
limited rationality but by changing the objectives, and improvements made to the 
agents using more realistic or effective agents. In the following, we present the most 
relevant protocol of coalition formation, keeping in mind that unlike our protocol, 
these current protocols are based on aggregation of agent preferences or on a common 
utility function.  
 
8.2.1 Forming overlapping coalitions with multiple tasks  
 
The basic model proposed by  (Shehory and Kraus, 1998) has the following 
characteristics: 
- The game is not necessarily super-additive or sub-additive. 
- The agents can take part in several coalitions simultaneously. 
- Each agent has a list of capabilities and each task requires a list of capabilities. 
- The tasks can be partially ordered. 
- The agents cooperate and seek to maximize a single and total utility function. 
The problem of distribution thus does not arise.  
 
The protocol is based on two phases. Initially, thevalues of all the possible 
coalitions are computed in a distributed way. The value of a coalition corresponds to 
the value of the task minus the cost of coordinatio related to the coalition and minus 
the cost of the capabilities used. In the second phase, the coalitions are formed 
gradually. In each sub-stage, the coalition which has the lowest cost per participant is 
formed and the value of all the remaining coalitions is recomputed so as to take into 
account the modifications generated by the use of capabilities related to the formation 
of coalitions.  
The algorithm ends when there are no more tasks or agents. This algorithm remains 
very greedy in terms of time. In order to decrease it  complexity, the authors 
recommend limiting the coalitions available, for instance, computing only thoses 
coalitions with less than k agents. The number of possible coalitions decreases then 
from
n2
to
)( knO
. The complexity of the protocol per agent is around 
)( TnO k×
 
(with 
T
 the number of tasks).  
 
This algorithm is promising especially because it is the first to propose a functional 
method for coalition formation within a general framework: several coalitions by 
agent. The protocol is simple and the simulations show that the results obtained are 
close to the optimal results. However, this protocol has several limits. (1) It focuses 
on the problem of coalition formation and the problems of distribution of the profits 
and of optimizations are not addressed. (2) A global utility function is supposed to be 
known and shared by all the agents. (3) The value of the set of all coalitions 
considered as acceptable is calculated. This calculation can become too complex to be 
done in reasonable time if the number of agents is too high as it could be the case in a 
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real application. (4) Each time that a condition changes (a new coalition, but also the 
addition of a task or of an agent, etc.), all the calculations for evaluating the values of 
the coalitions must be computed again. This constrai t prevents the algorithm from 
being useful in open or dynamic environments. If agents constantly enter and leave of 
the system, if they build temporal preferences or if tasks are added progressively, the 
method cannot be used.  
8.2.2 Search for a minimum solution 
Sandholm, Larson, Andersson, Shehory and Tohmé (Sandholm and others, 1999) 
have proposed a protocol that provides a final solution which is at least equal to a 
certain proportion of the optimal solution, in term of value of the common objective 
function. This protocol can be applied under the following usual conditions. There are 
no externality between tasks, tasks are not necessarily uper-additive or sub-additive, 
each agent belongs to only one coalition at a time. It is thus a problem of distributing 
the set of agents. The agents cooperate and seek to maximize a common and social 
utility function. This protocol reasons on the different levels of possible sets of 
coalitions represented in a lattice. For instance, for 4 agents there are 14 possible 
coalitions and 15 possible sets. This protocol shows that it is possible to obtain a 
result that is relatively close to the optimum by calculating a small proportion of the 
total number of nodes. It has been extended in (Sen and Dutta, 2000). We can, 
however, observe that when the number of agents becom  relatively high, the 
minimum guaranteed is very low compared to the optimum whereas the number of 
nodes to be computed and the calculation complexity increase rapidly (because of the 
number of agents).  
8.2.3 Heterogeneous agents  
8.2.3.1 Constraints on agents computation  
The limits of the rationality of the agents can be addressed at several levels. 
Sandholm and V. Lesser (Sandholm and others, 1999) propose a protocol based on 
agents which are limited in their computation capabilities. Calculating the 
optimization necessary for coordination and negotiati n is expensive. Compared to 
the calculating time, the agents minimize the total cost of the coalition, which is the 
difference between the cost of negotiation and the profit resulting from the 
negotiation for a given calculating time. This cost serves to compute the value of the 
coalition. The negotiation is expensive. However, the agents are supposed to be 
perfectly rational when they evaluate this cost. This means that they perfectly 
consider the profits resulting from a negotiation fr a certain period of time and that 
each coalition is really optimized and at no cost. The principal interest of this article 
lies in the formalism which is presented. This formalism is adapted to agents limited 
in computing time. They have also proposed a relevant cl ssification of the problems 
related to this case.  
8.2.3.2 Agents with multi-criteria preferences  
All the current models are based on the same assumption: the agents try to 
maximize a global utility function which was defined, either directly in the agents, or 
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by an agreement between the agents which will then distribute their payoffs. The 
coalition formation problem is considered as a distribu ed optimization problem. 
Though limited by the constraints of a decentralized multi-agent system (nevertheless 
the agents seek their personal interest and, unless a l the agents seek the collective 
interest, there will be some constraints on distribu ing the payoff in order to ensure the 
stability of the solution), these methods propose a centralization of the problem 
(handling a collective utility function, often calcu ating the value of all the possible or 
desirable coalitions). This involves a strong complexity of the algorithms (even per 
agent), and coordination problems and social negotiati n on the utility functions and 
on the final distribution.  
A decentralized approach to the coalition formation problem would seem to 
comply both with the agent-oriented approach (independence) and with economic 
reality (a large number of agents). The self-interested case can also be considered. 
This approach was chosen by (Aknine, Pinson, and Shakun, 2004a, Aknine, Pinson, 
and Shakun, 2004b). They consider the preferences of the agents and not a global 
utility function. When a coalition is formed, agents consider the aggregated 
preferences of the coalition, but never a global aggre ate such as the global utility 
which is neither necessary nor calculated.  
The model presented here is based on two fundamental concepts: the Choquet 
integral as an aggregation operator and the ESD (Evolutionary System Design) 
methodology for coalition formation. The Choquet integral makes it possible to carry 
out multi-criteria aggregations by taking into account the collective weights of several 
criteria which are different from their sum. The agents are characterized by a multi-
criteria utility function which assigns to each agent a vector representing its 
preferences with respect to each criterion. The Choquet integral is used to:  
• aggregate the preferences of an agent with respect to another agent,  
• aggregate the preferences of an agent with respect to several other agents 
and obtain its preference for a coalition, 
• aggregate the preferences of several agents with respect to another agent 
in order to obtain the preference of a coalition for an agent.  
 
To form the coalitions, agents use the ESD methodology to restructure a problem. 
This method has been developed by Shakun (Shakun, 1998). Two types of protocol 
are proposed, depending on how the agents do or do not share their preferences. 
Sharing the preferences is realistic in a cooperative situation; it provides a more 
comfortable situation and so a more effective soluti n. Forbidding the sharing of 
preferences makes it possible to handle non-cooperativ  situations with self-interested 
agents. The two protocols can be viewed as protocols for making contracts (such as 
the Contract-Net Protocol) with broader coalitions. When preferences are not shared, 
each agent concerned announces that it is seeking to form a coalition, receives 
alternative proposals, studies these proposals on its own behalf or as a representative 
of its coalition. If the preferences are shared, the agent which wants to form a 
coalition saves time by looking in its knowledge base the preference structures which 
are compatible with its own structure. (Vauvert and El Fallah-Seghrouchni, 2001) 
studies the case of overlapping coalitions which are formed gradually through 
alliances and progressive adaptation of the preferenc s of the agents (the agent 
interest it is to adapt so as not to be excluded from the coalitions).  
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8.2.3.3 Other models 
 
Several coalition formation models have been suggested to date, for instance 
(Rahwan and Jennings, 2005) which extend earlier work of (Shehory and Kraus, 
1998) and which provides some heuristics to improve th  complexity of their 
mecanism.  
(Tsevovat and others, 2000) proposed an algorithm based on the principle of 
electing a leader for coalition formation. This algorithm has been applied to electronic 
commerce processes. This approach is similar to the ne proposed in (Aknine, Pinson, 
and Shakun, 2000). (Lerman and Shehory, 2000) have proposed an alternative, 
physics-motivated mechanism for coalition formation that treats agents as randomly 
moving, locally interacting entities. They consider that a new coalition may form 
when two agents meet randomly, and it may grow when a single agent randomly 
meets the coalition. The aim of this work was to define a mathematical model, 
formalized as a series of differential equations. These equations have steady state 
solutions that describe the equilibrium distribution f coalitions, but the authors have 
not given any details of the autonomous agent behaviors and how they concretely use 
this mathematical model. No algorithmic specifications have been proposed and the 
convergence of this model has not been addressed.  
 
(Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994, Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1996) have proposed a 
mechanism for coalition formation that uses cryptography techniques for sub-additive 
task-oriented domains. This mechanism is based on a Shapley value. A Shapley value 
for an agent is a weighted average of all the utilities of the agent which contributes to 
all possible coalitions. The weight of each coalition is the probability that this 
coalition will be formed in a random process that st rt  with the first agent, and in 
which this coalition grows by one agent at a time such that each agent that joins the 
coalition is credited with its contribution to the coalition. The Shapley value is the 
expected utility that each agent will have from such a random process  . However, this 
mechanism can only be applied to small-sized multi-agent systems because of its 
combinatorial complexity due to the calculation of all possible coalitions. 
Recently, a solution that suggests that agents compro ise their gains to promote 
coalition formation was suggested (Kraus, Shehory, and Taase, 2003a, Kraus, 
Shehory, and Taase, 2003b). However, this work assume  that the value at which 
compromise is beneficial is known, or can be derived experimentally. In many real 
applications where coalitions are necessary, this assumption does not hold. In our 
solution to the coalition formation problem, we do n t assume that the optimal 
solution points are known in advance. Rather, we provide agents with means to 
gradually arrive at an agreed solution via a series of discussions. 
9 Conclusion and future work  
In this paper, we have proposed a distributed protocol adapted to problems 
requiring coordination through the formation of coalitions where it is not desirable, or 
possible, to aggregate, or share, the preferences of the agents. The protocol provides 
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optimal Pareto-type solutions. One of the advantages of this protocol is that, if 
changes occur in the multi-agent system, it enables ag nts to compute a new solution, 
which is always Pareto-optimal, dynamically and quickly, on the basis of the current 
solution. 
 
It is difficult to compare our protocol to current protocols since it does not have the 
same objectives. In current protocols, utility functions of the agents are either global 
for all agent or systematically aggregated. On the contrary, the utilities here are 
neither aggregated nor transmitted. The results cannot thus be compared because they 
relate to different problems. However, if all the agents have an identical utility 
function at the beginning, our suggested protocol sh uld obtain the same result as that 
of (Shehory and Kraus, 1998) or (Aknine, Pinson, and Shakun, 2000). 
 
For the considered problem, which is formation and restructuring of coalitions 
without aggregation of agent preferences, we have shown in this paper that the 
protocol allow to obtain a solution which is a Pareto optimum. Moreover, the tests 
have shown that the average complexity remained low c mpared to the total number 
of possible cases. In spite of these encouraging results, many improvements are still 
possible and are currently being addressed. 
 
Regarding the protocol, a logical extension would be to send sets with constraints 
on the coalitions instead of sending several independent sets of coalitions. For 
instance, in our application of drawing up schedules, instead of transmitting three sets 
of coalitions with the three alternatives time 1, time 2, time 3, one agent could send: 
"time ranging between 1 and 3". This would reduce the number of sets of coalitions to 
be computed and would enable the agent which receivs them to make an intelligent 
search instead of having to evaluate all the sets without seeking links between them. 
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